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This paper examines the causal relationship between financial 
development and economic growth in Egypt during the period 1960-2001. To 
perform this analysis we employ four different measures of financial 
development and apply Granger causality tests using the cointegration and vector 
error correction methodology. Our results significantly support the view that 
financial development Granger-causes economic growth either through 
increasing investment efficiency or through increasing resources for investment. 
This finding suggests that the financial reforms launched in 1990 can explain the 
rebound in economic performance since then and that further deepening of the 
financial sector is an important instrument to stimulate saving/investment and 
therefore long-term economic growth. 
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1.  Introduction 
Disparities in economic performances among countries is a subject that has 
attracted much attention recently. Among the major factors believed to account for 
this diversity is financial functioning. The relationship between financial 
development and economic growth has been comprehensively treated in the recent 
theoretical and empirical literature (see McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973; Fry, 1978, 
1988 and World Bank, 1989). Government restrictions on banking systems through 
interest rate ceilings on deposits and high reserve requirements create a shortage of 
funds and reduce the efficiency of capital - factors that are essential for economic 
growth. Government ownership of banks is another form of intervention in financial 
systems which may have adverse impact on financial development. Government 
owned banks provide politicians the power to allocate credit to incompetent 
enterprises to advance their political interests in the cost of productive private 
investment (Demetriades and Andrianova, 2004). Privatizing government owned 
banks can enhance credit allocation and thereby increase quantity and quality of 
investment (Demetriades and Andrianova, 2004). La Porta et al. (2002) examined 
the relationship between government ownership of banks, financial development 
and economic growth using a cross section data and found that such ownership has 
significant negative consequences on financial development and economic growth.  
The endogenous growth literature stresses the importance of financial 
development for economic growth as many important services are provided by a 
country's financial system. These services include the collection and the analysis of 
information regarding possible investment projects and channeling funds to the 
most profitable ones thereby increasing the productivity of investment.  Also, 
allowing risk sharing encourages risky and productive investment. Furthermore, a 
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more efficient financial sector reduces transaction costs and therefore increases the 
share of savings that is channeled to productive investments (Greenwood and 
Jovanovic, 1990; Bencivenga and Smith, 1991).  
Numerous empirical studies have tested the relationship between financial 
development and economic growth utilizing different econometric methodologies, 
but mostly applying cross-country regressions (World Bank, 1989; King and 
Levine, 1993a, b among others). According to this approach a vast array of 
variables can be examined as potential determinants of economic growth. Results 
obtained by using a financial development indicator as a regressor and achieving a 
statistically significant positive coefficient in the equation of economic growth have 
been interpreted to confirm the theory that financial development promotes 
economic growth. However, this method fails to distinguish between statistical 
association and causation. In fact, what is being observed in these studies is merely 
an association between financial development and economic growth that bears no 
implications of statistical causation. Furthermore, evidence of a significant positive 
correlation is also consistent with financial development following economic 
growth (Robinson, 1952). Evidence concerning the effect of financial development 
on economic growth from these studies varied according to the set of countries in 
the sample, the time span, and the set of variables included in the regressions. Such 
ambiguity can be attributed, in part, to statistical pitfalls that cross-section 
regressions are known to suffer from.  
Improper assessments of causal relationships in a static cross-section setting 
led researchers to seek more dynamic time series analyses to uncover whether 
financial development causes economic growth or vice versa. Granger causality 
tests have been the principal tool for investigating this issue.  
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Empirical work on causality between financial development and economic 
growth is sparse, owing to a lack of sufficiently long time series data for developing 
countries. Jung (1986) was among the first to test for causality by applying a 
Granger-causality procedure. He used annual data on per capita GNP and two 
measures of financial development: the ratio of currency to M1 and the ratio of M2 
to GDP, for 56 developed and developing countries. However, his results were 
inconclusive because they varied according to the financial development indicator 
used and the development level of the various countries. For example, using the 
currency ratio as a measure for financial development, Granger causality from 
financial development to economic growth in LDCs was more frequently observed 
than the reverse and an opposite conclusion was obtained for the developed 
countries. However, when the M2/GDP ratio was used, causality from financial 
development to economic growth was as frequently observed as causality from 
economic growth to financial development both in LDCs and developed countries. 
Jung’s test was conducted in a levels vector autoregression (VAR) framework 
without testing for stationarity of the data. As data are very likely to be 
nonstationary, Jung's findings are debatable (Granger and Newbold, 1974). In a 
frequently-cited paper, Demetriades and Hussein (1996) tested for cointegration 
among variables and used an error correction model for 16 countries to test for a 
possible long run causal relationship between financial development and economic 
growth. Their findings showed little evidence to support the view that finance leads 
economic growth.  
In the present paper, we re-examine the causal relationship between financial 
and economic development from a time-series perspective for Egypt.  For this, we 
apply the most current econometric techniques, in particular testing causality 
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applying cointegration tests and error correction models after pre-testing for unit 
roots in all variables and choosing the optimal lag order in our VAR system. These 
tests are essential for attaining the proper inferences. We use four different measures 
of financial development and relatively long annual time series data. We also 
include a third variable, namely the share of fixed investment in GDP, in the system. 
This allows us to test channels through which financial development affects 
economic growth, through increasing productivity or through increasing saving 
resources and therefore investment. Furthermore, using variance decompositions, 
we estimate the relative importance of financial development and investment for 
explaining changes in the growth rate of per capita GDP beyond the sample period.  
We focus on Egypt since during the period 1960-2001, the Egyptian 
economy underwent a transition from financial repression with a negative trend of 
per capita GDP from the late 1970s to a period of economic growth that began in 
the early 90s. This economic rebound can be explained, at least in part, by the 
financial reforms launched in 1990, which relaxed most restrictions on the financial 
sector.  
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the economic and 
financial developments in Egypt for the past four decades including the 1990 
financial reforms. In Section 3 we describe the variables used in the paper as well as 
the data sources. Section 4 lays out the econometric methodology based on 
cointegration and error-correction (ECM) models and Granger causality. Section 5 
presents the empirical findings. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the major findings 
and makes some concluding remarks.  
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2.  A Brief Review of Economic and Financial Development in Egypt  
 
 Egypt has spent most of the period under study here, 1960-2001, operating 
in an illiberal economic environment, with commodity, labor, and financial markets 
all subject to significant degrees of government intervention. This intervention was 
dominant in particular in the financial markets with numerous financial repression 
means that included administrative control on most deposit and lending interest 
rates, control over the allocation of credit to particular sectors, preferential interest 
rates to some sectors, high taxation of the domestic banking sector through 
excessive reserves requirements, state ownership of banks, and tight control on 
external capital movements. Since 1990, however, liberalization has been a major 
theme of Egyptian economic policy, especially the financial markets, being freed 
from some of the restrictions previously applied. This liberalization initiative has 
opened up many possibilities for deeper and more effective financial markets that 
are essential for promoting economic development (Roe, 1998).  
 During the period under investigation, the economic performance of the 
Egyptian economy was largely affected by the government interventions. The 
massive intervention until 1990 resulted in lower saving rates leading to lower 
investment. Furthermore, most of the investment was undertaken by the inefficient 
public sector. 
 We divide our historical review of the Egyptian financial and economic 
development into three phases depending on the economic policies adopted by the 
Egyptian government: the socialist revolution during the 1960s, the Open Door 
policy during the 1970s and the 1980s, and finally the Economic Reform and 
Structural Adjustment Project (ERSAP) of the 1990s.  
  7 
 
2.1  The Socialist Revolution 1960-1973 
 The period witnessed the maturation of certain trends, which were 
developing since 1956. Signs for state activism in advancing socio-economic 
development could be easily seen in many of the government actions. More drastic 
measures of agrarian reform and nationalization of large foreign and Egyptian 
enterprises were introduced successively in 1956, 1957, 1961, and 1964, leading to 
the expansion of the public sector which succeeded to dominate the largest part of 
the economy outside of agriculture. Public investments, which resulted in the 
establishment of a large number of state-owned enterprises, particularly in 
manufacturing were a major reason for this expansion of the public sector.  
 As can be seen in Figure 1, the economy had enjoyed a relatively high 
growth rates up to the mid 1960s. The fairly high GDP growth rates during this 
period were a result of the increased volume of investments rather than improving 
efficiency in the use of existing resources. The nationalization of the organized 
sector of the economy, increased the amount of potential savings under state 
disposal, and hence enabled it to increase the ratio of investment from 14% during 
the first half of the 1950’s to 18% and 17.4% in 1963 and 1964 respectively. This 
rise was also possible thanks to large flows of foreign aid coming in particular from 
the Soviet Union, the USA, and the Federal Republic of Germany (Al-Sayyid, 
2003).  
In 1962, the banking system consisted of the central bank, three specialized 
banks, and five commercial banks each of them dealt with specific sector of the 
economy. The central bank controlled the commercial banks through credit ceilings 
and reserves ratio that was raised to 17.5% in 1962 and to 20% in 1966. These 
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restrictions resulted in a steady decline in credit to the private sector as can be seen 
in Figure 2. The share of credit to the private sector in GDP went down from 18.6% 
in 1960 to 11.2% in 1973. Over the same period the share of credit to the private 
sector in total domestic credit declined from 44.9% to 21.1%. 
 Between June 1967 and October 1973 the Egyptian economy had 
experienced the impact of two wars and it was a transition period in Egypt both 
economically and politically, from State Socialism before 1967 to Capitalism 
described as an Open Door Policy that was initiated in 1974 by Anwar El-Sadat 
who followed Gamal Abdel-Nassir as a President of Egypt in 1970.  
 The defeat of Egypt in the 1967 war cost the country loss of revenues from 
the Suez Canal and oil fields in Sinai and as a result of increased military 
expenditure to make up for weapons destroyed during that war and to enhance its 
defense capacities. Both saving/GDP and Investment /GDP ratios went down from 
their levels before 1967, averaging 8.8% and 12%, respectively, during the 1967-
1973 period (see IY in Figure 1).  The average growth rates of GDP and GDP per 
capita during this period were 3.1% and 1%, respectively. However, the economy 
recovered somewhat in 1969 and 1970 with growth rates of 6.8% and 5.6%, 
respectively, but such rates fell considerably in the early 1970’s. The large drop in 
both the savings and investment rates during those years, particularly in 1970-1972, 
could be an immediate but not a sufficient cause for the sluggish growth rates in 
those years. Growth rates rose again after 1974, boosted primarily by hike in oil 
prices and revenues from the Suez Canal. 
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2.2  The Open Door Policy 1974-1990 
 The period 1974-1990 constituted a turning point in recent economic history 
of Egypt. It embarked the stage for a radical transformation of the Egyptian 
economy, social structure and politics. The "Open Door Policy" launched by Sadat 
in 1974 to encourage  foreign capital to come to the country was only the first step 
towards a return to the private enterprise-dominated economy that preceded the shift 
to state-socialism in the 1960s. The political system moved away from the single 
mass-organization to multi-partyism, but still with the presence of a dominant party, 
which has the monopoly of government authority at national and local levels. Such 
shift to a more liberal political system allowed different types of interest groups to 
become in a position to influence government policy.  
 During this period, major structural imbalances in the Egyptian economy 
hindered sustainable growth. These include imbalance between government revenue 
and spending, savings and required investments, imports and exports, demand for 
labor and its supply. The severity of these imbalances was eased in some years due 
to rise in prices of oil or workers remittances, but apart from deficits in the state 
budget which narrowed down in the 1990’s, such imbalances continued to constrain 
growth of the economy till the current days. Market inefficiencies were promoted 
through the 1980s by different restrictions such as administered prices, interest rate 
ceilings and various restrictions on private and foreign sectors. The financial sector 
suffered from segmentation, mandatory and subsidized credit allocation with 
negative real interest rates. The promotion of large scale public enterprises with the 
limits on export promotion weakened the private sector further. In 1982-3, the 
government implemented several policies to slow down the rate of growth of 
domestic credit and money supply. These policies included restrictions on lending 
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by significantly raising the reserves ratio. The major burden of the credit ceiling was 
placed on the private sector, although credit growth to the pubic sector was reduced 
as well (El-Erian et. al., 1996). The private investments that moved in at tandem 
with the share of private credit in total domestic credit (PRIVATE) and that had 
tripled their share in total investment between 1973 and 1975 in reaction to the 
Open Door Policy and sustained their high share until 1981, went down to less than 
10% of GDP reaching their lowest level in 1986 (see PISHARE in Figure 1).  
 The aforementioned imbalances coupled with market inefficiencies that 
were promoted by government intervention did not allow the economy to sustain the 
high growth rates that followed the hike in oil prices and that accompanied the rise 
in the share of private investment after 1974. Real per capita GDP growth rate 
fluctuated sharply during this period, with lower rates of 0.5%, 0.1% and 0% 
achieved in 1974, 1986 and 1987, respectively, and highest rates of 12.2%, 10.3% 
and 7.3% in 1976, 1977 and 1980, respectively. 
  
2.3  The Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP) 
 The period since 1991 has been the most crucial in recent economic history 
of Egypt as it is marked by the definitive and explicit commitment of the Egyptian 
government to a policy of market economy based on private sector. The Egyptian 
government launched the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program 
(ERSAP) that was formulated in close consultation with the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank to move the economy from a public sector dominated one 
to one in which the private sector assumes the largest responsibility for generating 
investment and leading growth. The plan included a variety of measures such as 
commodity price liberalization, privatization of some public enterprises, 
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encouraging and facilitating larger inflows of foreign capital. Reforms in the 
financial sector focused first, on enhancing the attractiveness of the domestic 
currency assets through interest and credit liberalization. The second phase focused 
on increasing private involvement in commercial banking and securities to improve 
the competitiveness of the financial sector. These reforms led to the expansion of 
the financial asset intermediation as is evident in Figure 2.  Moreover, the banking 
system was restructured to become more attractive for foreign banks to participate 
in the Egyptian market. According to Lee (2002), the share of foreign banks in total 
banks in Egypt increased from 3% in 1995 to 20% in 2000 (foreign banks being 
defined by having at least 50% foreign ownership), thus increasing their assets share 
from 1% to 7%. 
 A prominent feature of investment in this period is the increasing proportion 
of private investment, and the end of the dominant position of public sector. Private 
sector investments started to exceed those of the public sector since 1991. The 
relative shares of the two sectors are fixed since 1995 with the private sector 
contributing about two thirds of investments. This pattern is a reversal of the 
observed pattern under the Open Door Policy in which the public sector provided no 
less than half of total investments with the exception of the two years of 1974 and 
1975 (Al-Sayyid, 2003). A significant part of private sector investments originated 
from credit provided mostly by public sector banks which grew steadily during this 
period from 22% of GDP in 1991 to escalate to their highest ever level of 54.5% of 
GDP in 2001 (see PRIVY in Figure 2). Meanwhile, the volume of the public 
business sector of bank loans remained constant while that of the private sector kept 
increasing throughout the 1990’s to pass 50% of total domestic credit in 1997 
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reaching their highest level ever of 58% of total domestic credit in 2001 (see 
PRIVATE in Figure 2).  
 1991 marked also a rebound in the economic performance of Egypt. 
Average growth rate of real per capita GDP for the period 1991-2001 was 2.2%, and 
2.8% if we exclude the years 1991 and 1993. The first year was that of the Second 
Gulf War as well as the beginning of the implementation of the ERSAP. This 
rebound in the economic performance did occur despite greater difficulties of the 
Egyptian economy to mobilize investments. The investment/GDP ratio dropped 
from 22.2% in 1991 to below the 20% throughout the whole period except in 1998 
and 1999. One can argue, therefore, that the rebound in the economic growth that 
has occurred despite the decline in total investment can be attributed to efficiency 
gains from private investment dominance, enhanced by the financial liberalization 
since 1991,  as was mentioned earlier. Following the ERSAP there has been also 
considerable foreign interest in Egypt's privatization offerings and a rise in foreign 
direct investment to the country (Roe, 1998). 
 From the above historical review of the Egyptian economy one can learn 
that the economic performance of Egypt was largely affected by government 
policies and especially in the financial sector that determined the allocation of 
resources between the public and the private sectors. The larger the role played by 
the more efficient private sector the better is the economic performance of the 
economy. The development of the financial sector has been critical for the 
development of the private sector and therefore for economic growth. It is the 
matter of this paper to test the causal relationship between the financial 
development and economic development in Egypt throughout the past four decade. 
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3.  Measurement and Data Sources 
3.1 Financial Development Indicators 
Financial development is usually defined as a process that marks 
improvements in quantity, quality, and efficiency of financial intermediary services. 
This process involves the interaction of many activities and institutions. 
Consequently, it cannot be captured by a single measure. In this study we employ 
four commonly used measures of financial development for the sake of testing the 
robustness of our findings. 
The first, M2Y, represents the ratio of money stock, M2, to nominal GDP. 
M2Y has been used as a standard measure of financial development in numerous 
studies (Gelb, 1989; World Bank, 1989; King and Levine, 1993a, b; Calderon and 
Liu 2003).  According to Demetriades and Hussein (1996), this indicator accords 
well with McKinnon's outside money model where the accumulation of lumpy 
money balances is necessary before self-financed investment can take place. 
However, it conflicts somewhat with the debt-intermediation approach developed 
by Gurley and Shaw (1995) and the endogenous growth literature, because a large 
part of the broad money stock in developing countries is currency held outside 
banks. As such, an increase in the M2/GDP ratio may reflect an extensive use of 
currency rather than an increase in bank deposits, and for this reason this measure is 
less indicative of the degree of financial intermediation by banking institutions. 
Financial intermediaries serve two main functions: to provide liquidity services and 
saving opportunities, the latter being relevant for promoting investment and 
consequently growth. For this reason, Demetriades and Hussein (1996) proposed to 
subtract currency outside banks from M2 and to take the ratio of M2 minus currency 
to GDP as a proxy for financial development. In the case of Egypt, currency held 
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outside banks consisted of about 50% of M2 on average for the period 1960-1975. 
However, this rate has declined steadily since then and even at a higher pace since 
1990, reaching 13% by 2001 (see C2M2 in Figure 2).  On this basis, we chose 
QMY, the ratio of M2 minus currency to GDP, to serve as our second measure of 
financial development. 
Our third measure of financial development is PRIVY, the ratio of bank 
credit to the private sector to nominal GDP. This indicator is frequently used to 
provide direct information about the allocation of financial assets.  A ratio of M2 
(including or excluding currency) to GDP may increase as a result of an increase in 
private financial saving. On the other hand, with high reserve requirements, credit to 
the private sector which eventually is responsible for the quantity and quality of 
investment and therefore to economic growth, may not increase. Therefore, an 
increase in this ratio does not necessarily mean an increase in productive 
investments.  Rather, the private credit GDP ratio can be a better estimate of the 
proportion of domestic assets allocated to productive activity in the private sector. 
Figure 2 shows that M2Y had increased tremendously starting the late 1970 to reach 
80% in 1982 and fluctuated in the range of 80%-90% between 1982 and 1995 and 
kept a stable rate of 80% since then (see Figure 2).  During the period 1975-1990, 
the financial system in Egypt was largely repressed with high reserves requirements, 
therefore, with the relatively high inflation rates one should expect banks seeking a 
desired level of profitability to charge higher lending rates which will reduce the 
demand for loans and bring to lower deposits in contrast to the observed high M2Y 
ratio. Two explanations for this behavior were given by Roe (1998). The first is the 
possibility that the dominating state-owned banks did not have a profit maximizing 
goal. The second is that banks preferred to serve the interest of their non-private 
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clients, and offered loans to public enterprises even at the expense of their 
profitability.  To sum up, the high M2Y rate, in Egypt's case, does not necessarily 
imply a larger pool of resources for the private sector and therefore is not a good 
indicator of financial development, in contradiction, to PRIVY. The latter is most 
evidently related to the quantity and efficiency of investment and hence to economic 
growth (Gregorio and Guidotti, 1995). PRIVY has been used extensively in 
numerous works (King and Levine, 1993a, b; Gregorio and Guidotti, 1995; Levine 
and Zeroves, 1993; Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; Beck et al. 2000 among 
others), with different definitions of the stock of private credit depending on the 
institutions supplying the credit.1  
The fourth financial development indicator is the ratio of credit issued to 
nonfinancial private firms to total domestic credit (excluding credit to banks), 
PRIVATE, to capture the role of the distribution of credit between private and 
public sectors.  
3.2  Other Variables  
Following standard practice, we use real GDP per capita, GDPPC, as our 
measure for economic development (see Gelb, 1989; Roubini and Sala-i-Martin, 
1992; king and Levine, 1993a, b; Demetriades and Hussein, 1996). In addition to 
the per capita real GDP and the financial development indicator, we introduced a 
third variable in our VAR system, the share of investment in GDP, IY. This variable 
is considered to be one of the few economic variables with a robust correlation to 
economic growth regardless of the information set (Levine and Renelt, 1992).2 
Including the investment variable in our regressions enables us to identify the 
                                                          
1
 For more details on this issue see the discussion in Beck et al. (2000). 
2
 Many articles have investigated the causal relationship between exports and growth in Egypt (see 
Reizman et al., 1996 and Abu-Qarn and Abu-Bader, 2004). When we included this variable in our 
system, our main findings were not affected by its exclusion. 
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channels through which financial development causes economic growth. If financial 
development causes economic development, given the investment variable, then this 
causality supports the endogenous growth theories that finance affects economic 
growth mainly through the enhancement of investment efficiency. Furthermore, we 
can then test if financial development causes economic growth through an increase 
of investment resources. We can examine this supposition indirectly by testing the 
causality between financial development indicators and investment on the one hand 
and between investment and economic growth on the other. 
In addition to the three variables described above, we introduced a dummy 
variable that takes the value zero up to 1990 and the value one afterward, to account 
for the 1990 financial reforms launched in Egypt. All the variables in our data set 
are expressed in natural logarithms.  
 
3.3  Data Sources  
We used the following data resources: Financial development measures were 
calculated from International Financial Statistics (IFS) 2003 CD-ROM. IY and 
GDDP data were obtained from the World Development Indicators (WDI) 2003 
CD-ROM. Our sample covers the period 1960-2001; the choice of this period is 
governed by data availability.  
 
4.  The Econometric Methodology 
Standard Granger Causality (SGC)  
 
According to Granger's (1969) approach, a variable Y is caused by a variable 
X if Y can be predicted better from past values of both Y and X than from past values 
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of Y alone. For a simple bivariate model, we can test if X is Granger-causing Y by 
estimating Equation (1) and then test the null hypothesis in Equation (2) by using 
the standard Wald test.  
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where µ is a constant and tu is a white noise process. Variable X is said to Granger-
cause variable Y if we reject the null hypothesis (2), where 12γ  is the vector of the 
coefficients of the lagged values of the variable X. Similarly, we can test if Y causes 
X by replacing Y for X and vice versa in Equation (1).  
The assumptions of the classical regression model require that both {Xt} and 
{Yt} be stationary and that errors have a zero mean and finite variance. In the 
presence of nonstationary variables, there might be what Granger and Newbold 
(1974) called a spurious regression, whereby the results obtained suggest that there 
are statistically significant relationships between the variables in the regression 
model when in fact all that is obtained is evidence of a contemporaneous correlation 
rather than meaningful causal relations. Thus, before conducting causality tests, 
variables must be found stationary individually or, if both variables are 
nonstationary, they must be cointegrated. The series {Xt} will be integrated of order 
d, that is, Xt ~I(d), if it is stationary after differencing it d times. A series that is I(0) 
is stationary. To test for unit roots in our variables, we use the Augmented Dickey 
Fuller (ADF) test. This test is based on an estimate of the following regression: 
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where 0a  is a drift, t represents a time trend, and p is a lag length large enough to 
ensure that tε  is a white noise process. Using the results of Dickey-Fuller (1979), 
the null hypothesis that the variable X is nonstationary )0:( 0 =βH  is rejected if β  
is significantly negative. Since it has been shown that ADF tests are sensitive to lag 
lengths (Campbell and Perron, 1991) we determine the optimal lag length by using 
the Schwarz criterion (SC). 
The next step is to test for cointegration if the variables are nonstationary in 
their levels. Generally, a set of variables is said to be cointegrated if a linear 
combination of the individual series, which are I(d), is stationary. Intuitively, if Xt 
~I(d) and Yt ~I(d), a regression is run, such as: 
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If the residuals, tε , are I(0), then Xt and Yt are cointegrated. We use 
Johansen’s (1988) approach, which allows us to estimate and test for the presence of 
multiple cointegration relationships, r, in a single-step procedure. A class of models 
that embodies the notion of correction has been developed and is referred to as the 
Error Correction Model (ECM). In general, an ECM derived from the Johansen test 
can be expressed as: 
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where ECTt-1 is the error correction term lagged one period, Z is a third endogenous 
variable in the system, and kij ,β  describes the effect of the k-th lagged value of 
variable j on the current value of variable i; i,j=X,Y,Z. The itε  are mutually 
uncorrelated white noise residuals. 
Granger causality from variable j to variable i in the presence of 
cointegration is evaluated by testing the null hypothesis that 0
,
== ikij αβ  for all k 
in the equation where i is the dependent variable, using the standard F test. By 
rejecting the null, we conclude that variable j Granger-causes variable i. These tests 
differ from standard causality tests in that they include error correction terms (ECTt-
1) that account for the existence of cointegration among the variables. At least one 
variable in Equations (5) to (7) should move to bring the relation back into 
equilibrium if there is a true economic relation, and therefore at least one of the 
coefficients of the error correction terms has to be significantly different from zero 
(Granger, 1988).  
 
5.  Empirical Results 
5.1  Granger Causality Results 
The first step of our empirical work was to determine the degree of 
integration of each variable. The ADF test results for the levels and first differences 
are reported in Table 1. The results show that all the variables are nonstationary – 
I(1) – in their levels, but stationary in their first differences.3  
The second step was to test for a cointegration relationship among the 
relevant variables. The results of Johansen’s maximum eigenvalue test ( maxλ ) (see 
Table 2) support the existence of a unique long run relation between per capita 
                                                          
3
 Using Phillips-Perron test we obtained similar results.  
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GDP, the investment ratio and financial development under the various measures of 
the latter. In all cases, we reject the null of a no-cointegration relationship at least at 
the 5% level. In Table 3 we see that financial development and economic growth 
have a positive long run relationship in all except when M2Y is used as an indicator 
of financial development. We previously outlined the inappropriateness of M2Y to 
serve as an indicator of financial development in Egypt and our results are in line 
with our expectations. 
Now that cointegration has been determined, we apply the ECM to detect the 
direction of causality between the variables. The main results of the causality tests 
as shown in Tables 4 and 5 can be summarized as follows: 
(a) The null hypothesis of no causality from financial development to 
economic growth was significantly rejected in three out of four cases 
(fourth column of Panel A in Table 4). The causality is unidirectional since 
the other direction of causality from economic growth to financial 
development was not observed (see fourth column of Panel B in Table 4).  
Only when M2Y was used for financial development, the null hypothesis 
of no Granger causality from financial development to economic 
development was not rejected even at the 10% significance level.  
(b) Table 5 presents the causality results between financial development and 
investment and between investment and economic growth. We found 
significant causality from financial development to investment (fourth 
column in panel A) using all financial indicators. Also, as expected, we 
found significant causal relationship from investment to economic growth, 
as can be seen from Panel B of Table 5, regardless of the measure of 
financial development used. Therefore, we can infer an indirect causality 
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from financial development to real GDP per capita through investment.  
As this is the only way M2Y causes GDPPC, one may conclude that M2 
channels funds to investment but does not increase the allocative 
efficiency of investment. 
 The results of the cointegration and Granger causality tests support the 
finance-led growth paradigm either directly through enhancing investment 
efficiency or through increasing investment resources. By the inclusion of the 
investment variable we could test if financial development affects economic growth 
by increasing investment efficiency rather than by only increasing resources 
available for investment. The three financial development indicators, PRIVY, 
PRIVATE, and LQMY affected economic growth either through increasing 
investment resources or through the enhancement of investment efficiency. 
However, M2Y affected economic growth only through increasing investment 
resources, as expected, in a country where a large part of M2 is held in the form of 
currency outside the banking sector. These findings are in line with earlier studies 
suggesting that PRIVY and PRIVATE rather than M2Y stimulate economic growth 
through improving investment efficiency (King and Levine, 1993a,b for example). 
 
5.2  Variance Decomposition Results  
Our empirical findings reveal both direct causality from financial 
development to economic growth (in three of four cases) and indirect causality 
through investment (in all cases). So, we next determine the relative importance of 
each of the financial development indicators and the investment variable in 
explaining real per capita growth beyond the sample period by using variance 
decomposition of the forecast error of per capita income. 
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Taking into account the VEC model in Equations 5-7, a change in any one of 
the random innovations ZYXiit ,,, =ε  will immediately change the value of the 
dependent variable and thus the future values of the other two variables through the 
dynamic structure of the system. Since an innovation in each of the three variables 
produces changes in future values of itself and the other two variables, it is possible 
to break down the forecast-error variance of economic growth in each future period 
and to determine the percentage of variance that each variable explains. Figures 3 
and 4 present the forecast results for twenty periods ahead. Table 6 gives the 
numerical values of the percentages for periods: five, ten and twenty. To assign 
variance shares to the different variables, the residuals in the equations must be 
orthogonalized. Therefore, we applied the Choleski decomposition method using the 
following ordering: financial development indicator, investment GDP ratio, real per 
capita income.   
Table 6 presents the percentages of the forecast-error variance of per capita 
GDP that are attributable to random innovation shocks in financial development and 
the investment variables after five, ten and twenty years. The table also presents the 
percentages of the forecast-error variance of investment variable that is attributable 
to random innovation shocks in the financial development variable. Figures 3 and 4 
show the same results for periods one to twenty years after an innovation shock 
takes place.4As can be seen, almost all the percentages of forecasting error variance 
of per capita GDP and the investment variables converge to their long run limit after 
ten years. 
                                                          
4
 The accumulative sum of the variance percentages does not sum up to 100% in a specific year 
because in each regression one financial development measure is used with the per capita GDP and 
investment variables. 
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In line with our Granger causality findings, financial development measures 
explain a large proportion of the forecasting error variance of real GDP per capita. 
The PRIVATE variable explains 27.4% of the variance after 5 years, 23.4% after 10 
years and 19.4% after 20 years. Larger proportions are explained by PRIVY, where 
35.1% of the variance is explained after 5 years and about 24% after 20 years. M2Y, 
the financial measure that was shown not to Granger cause economic growth, 
explains 17.8% of the error variance after 5 years but this percentage falls to 13.1% 
in period 20. How essential financial development for increasing investment 
resources? From Table 6 we can see that more than 30% of the forecast error 
variance of the investment variable is explained by M2Y even after 20 years but less 
than 14% is explained by PRIVY.  
The variance decomposition results in Table 6 provide further support for 
the argument that private credit measured either as PRIVY or PRIVATE is more 
significant to economic growth through increasing investment efficiency than the 
other measures, especially the ratio of broad money stock M2 to GDP. Furthermore, 
banking credit plays a major role in financing private investment, especially in a 
developing country such as Egypt.  
6.  Concluding Remarks 
Utilizing the most recent econometric time series techniques, we examined 
the causal relationship between measures of financial development, ratio of fixed 
capital GDP, and real GDP per capita in Egypt over the past four decades. We tested 
whether the financial reforms undertaken by the Egyptian economy in the early 
1990s can explain, at least partially, the recovery in Egypt's economic performance 
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since then. Even though the share of investment in GDP did not increase following 
the financial liberalization, there was a steady increase in the share of private 
investment in total investment. Our results support our belief that the rise in private 
investment that was facilitated by the financial liberalization in 1990 led to the 
rebound in economic performance of Egypt in the 1990s. Therefore, relaxing 
financial constraints and deepening the financial sector are essential to boost 
economic development through either increasing investment resources or enhancing 
investment efficiency. 
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Table 1 - ADF Unit Root Test Results 
 
LGDPPC, LPRIVATE, LPRIVY, LM2Y, LQMY, and LIY are the natural logarithms of real per capita GDP, 
share of credit to private sector in total domestic credit, share of credit to private sector in GDP, share of M2 in 
GDP, share of M2  minus currency outside of banking in GDP, and the share of gross fixed capital formation in 
GDP,  respectively. 
k* the optimal  lag lengths chosen by Schwarz  selection criterion with a maximum of 9 lags. 
 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
LM(4) is the Lagrange Multiplier test for up to fourth-order serial correlation in the residuals, which is 
asymptotically distributed 
2
)4(χ
. 
 
 
 
Table 2 - Johansen Cointegration Test Results 
Variables λmax P* r* 
 r = 0 r = 1 r=2   
LGDPPC, LIY, LPRIVATE 24.967** 
 
7.660 0.541 1 1 
LGDPPC, LIY, LPRIVY 21.207** 
 
5.036 0.701 1 1 
LGDPPC, LIY, LM2Y 23.032** 
 
12.443 0.175 1 1 
LGDPPC, LIY, LQMY 32.84*** 
 
10.162 2.428 2 1 
 
*; **; *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
λmax is the maximum eigenvalue statistic. 
p* represents the optimal lag length based on AIC from the unrestricted VAR model.  
r* is the number of cointegration vectors based on Johansen’s method. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable ADF with trend and intercept 
 Levels First differences 
 ADF k* LM(4) ADF k* LM(4) 
LGDPPC -2.218 1 1.658 -3.806*** 0 3.161 
LPRIVATE -1.773 0 9.782 -7.309*** 0 4.701 
LPRIVY -2.097 0 1.272 -6.589*** 0 0.853 
LM2Y -1.776 1 7.112 -3.806*** 0 5.888 
LQMY -1.735 1 5.603 -3.806*** 0 3.089 
LIY -2.132 1 3.74 -4.388*** 0 4.130 
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Table 3 – Cointegration Equations 
 
Financial development 
indicator 
Cointegration equation 
LPRIVATE LPRIVATELIYLGDPPC 52.008.143.2 ++=  
 
LPRIVY LPRIVYLIYLGDPPC 32.075.022.4 ++=  
 
LM2Y YLMLIYLGDPPC 216.342.592.3 −+=  
 
LQMY LQMYLIYLGDPPC 13.144.176.7 +−=  
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Table 4 - Results of Granger Causality Tests (Direct) 
 
 
)0( =ijF β and )0( =it α are the  standard F-statistic values for testing the null that all coefficients ijβ  in 
equation i are zeroes and the t-statistic for testing the null that iα  is zero, respectively, in Equation 5-7, where 
.,,, ZYXji =   Y stands per capita income, X stands for the financial development indicator, and Z stands for 
investment GDP ratio. )0( == iijF αβ  is the standard F-statistic value for testing the joint null hypothesis that 
all ijβ  and  iα  in equation i are zeroes. 
 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Lag lengths of the three variables were determined using Akaike’s AIC method, with maximum lags of 4 allowed 
for each variable. 
 
LM(3) is the Lagrange multiplier test for up to the third-order serial correlation in the residuals which is 
asymptotically distributed 2 )2(χ  
 
 
Panel A 
 
Null Hypothesis Yα  P*  LM(3) (P-value) 
Financial 
development 
indicator 
Financial development does not Granger 
cause income growth 
   
 
)0( =YXF β  )0( =Yt α   )0( == YYXF αβ   
  
   
LPRIVATE 5.768**  -2.44*** 5.616*** -0.046 1 6.590 
(0.68) 
LPRIVY 12.685***  -2.53*** 21.544*** -0.055 1 5.483 
(0.79) 
LM2Y 1.035  -1.247 1.462 -0.005 1 9.336 
(0.41) 
LQMY 10.215*** -1.299 6.831*** -0.019 2 10.208 
(0.33) 
 
Panel B 
    
 Null Hypothesis xα  P*   LM(3) (P-value) 
Financial 
development 
indicator 
Income growth does not Granger cause 
financial development 
   
 )0( =XYF β  )0( =Xt α   )0( == XXYF αβ     
LPRIVATE 1.426 2.10*** 2.214 0.236 1 6.590 
(0.68) 
LPRIVY 0.943 2.11** 2.233 0.319 1 5.483 
(0.79) 
LM2Y 0.070 -0.692 0.250 -0.007 1 9.336 
(0.41) 
LQMY 1.643 2.54*** 2.205 0.128 2 10.208 
(0.33) 
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Table 5 - Results of Granger Causality Tests (Indirect) 
 
Panel A 
 
Null Hypothesis Zα  P*  LM(3) (P-value) 
Financial 
development 
indicator 
Financial development  does not Granger cause 
fixed capital formation share in GDP 
   
 
)0( =ZXF β  )0( =Zt α   )0( == ZZXF αβ   
  
   
LPRIVATE 0.010 2.932*** 4.230** 0.35 1 6.590 
(0.68) 
LPRIVY 0.007 3.082*** 4.852** 0.47 1 5.483 
(0.79) 
LM2Y 12.046*** 4.400*** 14.122*** 0.09 1 9.336 
(0.41) 
LQMY 6.108*** -4.109*** 7.441*** -0.38 2 10.208 
(0.33) 
 
Panel B 
 Null Hypothesis yα  P*   LM(3) (P-value) 
Financial 
development 
indicator 
Fixed capital formation share in GDP does not 
Granger cause income growth given the financial 
indicator below 
   
 )0( =YZF β  )0( =Yt α   )0( == YYZF αβ     
LPRIVATE 1.851 -2.44*** 7.305*** 
-0.046 1 6.590 
(0.68) 
LPRIVY 0.179 -2.53*** 4.158** -0.055 1 5.483 
(0.79) 
LM2Y 5.593*** -1.247 4.754** -0.005 1 9.336 
(0.41) 
LQMY 8.204*** -1.299 5.741*** -0.019 2 10.208 
(0.33) 
 
)0( =ijF β and )0( =it α are the  standard F-statistic values for testing the null that all coefficients ijβ  in 
equation i are zeroes and the t-statistic for testing the null that iα  is zero, respectively, in Equation 5-7, where 
.,,, ZYXji =   Y stands per capita income, X stands for the financial development indicator, and Z stands for 
investment GDP ratio. )0( == iijF αβ  is the standard F-statistic value for testing the joint null hypothesis that 
all ijβ  and  iα  in equation i are zeroes. 
 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Lag lengths of the three variables were determined using Akaike’s AIC method, with maximum lags of 4 allowed 
for each variable. 
 
LM(3) is the Lagrange multiplier test for up to the third-order serial correlation in the residuals which is 
asymptotically distributed 2 )2(χ  
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Table 6 - Variance Decomposition of LGDPPC 
 
After fev =  forecast error variance 
 % of LGDDPC's fev 
Explained by 
LPRIVATE 
% of LGDDPC's  fev 
Explained by LIY 
% of LIY's  fev 
Explained by 
LPRIVATE 
5 years 27.4% 35.1% 3.6% 
10 years 23.4% 37.4% 3.5% 
20 years 19.4% 40.1% 3.9% 
    
 % of LGDDPC's fev 
Explained by LPRIVY 
% of LGDDPC's  fev 
Explained by LIY 
% of LIY's  fev 
Explained by LPRIVY 
5 years 35.1% 24.1% 15.2% 
10 years 29.8% 26.2% 14.5% 
20 years 23.9% 31.0% 13.7% 
    
 % of LGDDPC's fev 
Explained by LM2Y 
% of LGDDPC's  fev 
Explained by LIY 
% of LIY's  fev 
Explained by LM2Y 
5 years 17.8% 15.5% 41.0% 
10 years 16.5% 17.6% 32.3% 
20 years 13.1% 17.7% 29.6% 
    
 % of LGDDPC's fev 
Explained by LQMY 
% of LGDDPC's  fev 
Explained by LIY 
% of LIY's  fev 
Explained by LQMY 
5 years 45.9% 5.8% 56.7% 
10 years 33.3% 6.8% 49.3% 
20 years 20.1% 4.0% 46.5% 
 
. 
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Figure 1 
Macroeconomic Indicators: Egypt (1960-2001)
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Figure 2 
Financial Development Indicators: Egypt (1960-2001)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
196
0
196
3
196
6
196
9
197
2
197
5
197
8
198
1
198
4
198
7
199
0
199
3
199
6
199
9
Year
Pe
rc
en
t
C2M2 M2Y PRIVY PRIVATE
 
 
 
 
 
  35 
 
Figure 3 
Variance Decomposition of Per Capita Real GDP
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Figure 4 
 
 
Variance Decomposition of Investment GDP Ratio
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